How much should Israel pay for Gilad Shalit?

By Ira Sharkansky

JERUSALEM  — How much should Israel to pay for the release of Gilad Shalit? He is the soldier who was seized in June 2006 during a raid by Gazans on the Israeli side of the border. In the same incident, two Israelis soldiers died and several others suffered injuries.

Negotiations for a prisoner swap have proceeded in an on again off again fashion. Hamas has control of Shalit, and has denied all requests that the Red Cross or some other reputable organization be allowed to visit and report on his condition. There have been notes from him, an audio tape, and a video tape, all presumably coached and edited to show him alive and well treated, but anxious to return home.

Shalit has the advantage of educated and articulate parents, who have enlisted the help of public relations consultants to campaign in behalf of whatever concessions are necessary to release him. Groups of school children, media personalities, and politicians have used the slogan, “pay any price,” while others have been guarded in indicating that some prices are too high.

Palestinian prisoners are the medium of exchange. The problem is not the number mentioned in the information available to the public, most likely 1,000. Israel holds more than 11,000 Palestinians and other Arabs picked up over the years on security charges (murder, complicity in murder, weapons smuggling, incitement, activity in banned organizations), found guilty by civilian or military judges, or held in administrative detention. It would not be difficult to identify a thousand who committed their crimes years ago, or who did not commit the most serious crimes.

Israel’s problem with Hamas’ demands is that it includes a number of high profile individuals, guilty of especially sensitive crimes, who so far have served only a few years.

IDF commanders tell their troops that it is the highest priority to avoid capture, and to prevent the enemy from taking prisoners. When it does happen, it inevitably entails several years of difficult negotiations and intense emotions concerned with one or a few Israelis. Some efforts have ended without success, as a soldier known to be held captive either fled and died, or was traded among several groups until he disappeared. Other families have spent more than twenty years insisting that their sons were being held, but have found no evidence of their capture or their bodies. Lebanese groups have negotiated for men they said were prisoners, but where Israel received only bodies when the deal was completed.

Every deal has left a bitter taste among officials and citizens, which feeds back into opposition the next time. Individuals viewed as high profile killers in Israel have been lionized at home when released. Some have returned to violence, and eventually to Israeli prison.

Occasionally an Israeli speaks heroically about “no deal with terrorists,” but the sentiment does not hold up under public pressure. This time, as always, the issue is the number, and especially the “quality” of prisoners demanded by the captors.

Among the opponents of an “expensive” swap are families of people killed by those on the enemy’s list of demands, as well as ranking officers who worry about encouraging further raids to capture Israelis, the capacity of young killers to continue fighting where they left off when they were captured, and to serve as a message that violence pays. However, there are no groups that are total in their opposition to particular swaps. Some families of terror victims say that Israel should pay any price to prevent another family from suffering the loss of a loved one. Military officers say that it is a national obligation to do everything possible to assure the safety of draftees, and their return home after an engagement.

The issue is also difficult for those holding the Israelis. With thousands of Palestinians in Israeli prison, there are many thousands who want their sons, husbands, and brothers released. Who will be put on the list of demands is a matter of great sensitivity, capable of provoking violence by disappointed families.

In order to avoid the stain of talking directly with terrorists, Israel employs intermediaries. The German and Egyptian government have provided negotiators, and other governments–seemingly wanting to gain some credit for their good will–have claimed to be probing possibilities with those holding the captives.

The Shalit family, like those caught up in similar situations, has traveled the world seeking public support, and the favors of highly placed individuals. TV news showed a clip of Shalit’s father talking with Jimmy Carter that did not improve the former president’s reputation in Israel. He expressed strong emotion about the suffering he saw in Gaza, and was curtly dismissive of Shalit’s efforts to engage him about his son.

There have been several news stories, typically from Arab media that “the deal is almost done.” It would be finalized with one more meeting of the Hamas leadership, and would be finished after a Muslim holiday that was only a few days away. One report was that French physicians had examined Shalit. These would have been the first outsiders to visit him, and the examination was said to be part of his imminent release. We have heard that Israeli prison authorities have concentrated the individuals to be freed in one prison in preparation of a release. One rumor was that Shalit had already been transferred to Egyptian officials, long mooted as the first stage in a phased exchange.

Typically these stories are followed by clarifications from Hamas that the deal is not quite finished, and that a swap can occur only when Israel improves its offer.

Just what Israel is offering is secret. This allows the deal to go forward without intense pressure and violence on the Palestinian side about whose family member will be on the list. Secrecy also minimizes pressure on Israeli negotiators deliberating about the release of individuals with especially bad reputations. And it provides some protection to negotiators who are carrying out the instructions of political superiors to resist the release of particular individuals, or individuals whose crimes fall in the category of “no deal.”

Israeli officials have promised the public a period of 48 hours to know the final details, time enough to petition the Supreme Court to halt the release of certain individuals. Once a deal is in hand that passes muster with the prime minister and colleagues assigned to oversee negotiations, other members of the government will do what is necessary to put the issue behind them. The Court is likely to rule that it is a matter for the political leadership to decide, and the president will sign off on whatever pardons or commutations are necessary to put the individuals on the prison bus heading for the exchange point.

Never negotiate with terrorists? Only in your dreams. It is not simple. There has been no caving in to outrageous demands, but it does happen.

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Sharkansky is professor emeritus of political science at Hebrew University.  This column ran out of sequence, and should have appeared before one titled “All or Nothing Solutions are unrealistic in the Middle East.”